- JUNE 17, 2011, 12:36 A.M. ET
 
The European Union, European Central Bank and the  International Monetary Fund are negotiating hard among themselves about  how to structure debt relief for the Greek economy. The latest reports  suggest they might have come up with a temporary deal among themselves.  But what the EU, ECB and IMF want won't matter unless they get the Greek  government to play as well. And that's by no means assured.
 For one thing, Greeks are growing fed up with austerity and seem very  unwilling to take on the still stricter conditions being demanded of  them to win fresh funding and avoid default. The Greek economy has taken  a beating during the past couple of years. Non-stop, large-scale  political protests, routine general strikes and parliamentary rebellion  have brought Athenian streets to a standstill. And Prime Minister George  Papandreou's government is teetering.
 Greeks are starting to question whether there might not be an easier  way out of their crisis. And inevitably, Argentina's experience a decade  ago has been attracting plenty of interest.
 In the three years leading up to its crisis the Argentine economy  struggled, contracting a total of 8.4% by the end of 2001. Strains  became so great that the country defaulted on its sovereign debt,  causing its economy to slump another 11% in 2002. But the unshackling of  its currency from the dollar and subsequent devaluation also reignited  growth. Since its 2002 low, Argentine gross domestic product will have  expanded by an average annual 7.4% by the end of this year, according to  IMF data. Crucially, Argentine output was back above its previous peak  within three years of default.
 Compare this with Greece's prospects. The IMF forecasts the Greek  economy will have contracted 9.3% from its 2008 peak by the end of this  year. Although the IMF expects Greece to start growing again next year,  that is difficult to believe. The one constant of this crisis has been  that all forecasts for Greece have been overly optimistic. Worse still,  once Greece starts to grow, it is expected only to do so at an anemic  rate of around 2% per year. By the end of 2016, the Greek economy will  only just be back to end-2008 levels.
 Greeks might well decide an Argentine solution is the only real  option. In other words, an exit from the euro, default and devaluation.  And maybe that's what the market is already anticipating.
                  Barry Eichengreen, an economist at the University of  California, Berkeley, famously argued that a euro-zone country couldn't  leave the single currency because to do so would trigger "the mother of  all financial crises." Long before the long political process necessary  for any euro-zone country to leave the single currency was concluded,  investors would have voted with their wallets. They'd dump the country's  sovereign debt and flee its banks.
 But this is pretty much what has already happened to Greece. Two-year  Greek debt yields 28% while 10-year bonds are trading at less than half  of face value. And for months now, depositors have been pulling funds  out of Greek banks. Only the lifeline of yet more EU and IMF loans is  keeping Greece in the euro. Loans that will have to be paid back.
 If Greeks come to think they're already near or have reached the  worst-case outcome of a euro exit but are getting none of the upside,  they may well start to agitate to leave the single currency.
 That would put the EU and the ECB into a very difficult position. A  Greek default and departure from the euro would risk a systemic crisis  across Europe's financial sector because of the huge exposure of  Europe's banks to Greek government debt. The EU doesn't want to give in  to Greece because of the costs involved and for fear of feeding moral  hazard. But as the financial crisis showed, punctiliousness goes by the  wayside when the crunch becomes severe enough.
 The Bank of England worried publicly about the consequences of  bailing out Northern Rock but then, after the Lehman Brothers collapse,  had no compunction about pumping enormous amounts of money into the rest  of the U.K.'s banking sector.
 German, Dutch and Finnish politicians may be worried about how  handing bottomless buckets of money to Greece will play out with their  voters, but the alternative looks even uglier.
 Ironically, were the Greeks to decide that a euro exit was not only  possible, but desirable, the core EU, led by Germany, would almost  certainly make huge concessions, including wholesale debt forgiveness.
 Of course before they did so, core euro-zone countries would have to  weigh up the costs of letting Greece off the hook relative to another  rescue of their banking sectors. And not just Greece. Ireland and  Portugal and possibly Spain and Italy would demand some sort of easing  of their national liabilities if they saw Greece getting too good a  deal. This would potentially be catastrophic for the politicians making  the concessions. But the more Greeks become convinced they can go it  alone the better the deal the EU would have to serve up to prevent them  from doing so.
 Could core Europe do this without going the way of Ireland, becoming a  backstop that itself goes bust under the crushing weight of others'  debts? It'll be interesting to see who draws the line where in this  Greek standoff.
(http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304186404576389632761803982.html)