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小林的百科筆記

Showing posts with label bank. Show all posts
Showing posts with label bank. Show all posts

Canadian banks are typically leveraged at 18 to 1--compared with U.S. banks at 26 to 1.



The legendary editor of The New Republic, Michael Kinsley, once held a "Boring Headline Contest" and decided that the winner was "Worthwhile Canadian Initiative." Twenty-two years later, the magazine was rescued from its economic troubles by a Canadian media company, which should have taught us Americans to be a bit more humble. Now there is even more striking evidence of Canada's virtues. Guess which country, alone in the industrialized world, has not faced a single bank failure, calls for bailouts or government intervention in the financial or mortgage sectors. Yup, it's Canada. In 2008, the World Economic Forum ranked Canada's banking system the healthiest in the world. America's ranked 40th, Britain's 44th.


Canada has done more than survive this financial crisis. The country is positively thriving in it. Canadian banks are well capitalized and poised to take advantage of opportunities that American and European banks cannot seize. The Toronto Dominion Bank, for example, was the 15th-largest bank in North America one year ago. Now it is the fifth-largest. It hasn't grown in size; the others have all shrunk.


So what accounts for the genius of the Canadians? Common sense. Over the past 15 years, as the United States and Europe loosened regulations on their financial industries, the Canadians refused to follow suit, seeing the old rules as useful shock absorbers. Canadian banks are typically leveraged at 18 to 1—compared with U.S. banks at 26 to 1 and European banks at a frightening 61 to 1. Partly this reflects Canada's more risk-averse business culture, but it is also a product of old-fashioned rules on banking.


Canada has also been shielded from the worst aspects of this crisis because its housing prices have not fluctuated as wildly as those in the United States. Home prices are down 25 percent in the United States, but only half as much in Canada. Why? Well, the Canadian tax code does not provide the massive incentive for overconsumption that the U.S. code does: interest on your mortgage isn't deductible up north. In addition, home loans in the United States are "non-recourse," which basically means that if you go belly up on a bad mortgage, it's mostly the bank's problem. In Canada, it's yours. Ah, but you've heard American politicians wax eloquent on the need for these expensive programs—interest deductibility alone costs the federal government $100 billion a year—because they allow the average Joe to fulfill the American Dream of owning a home. Sixty-eight percent of Americans own their own homes. And the rate of Canadian homeownership? It's 68.4 percent.


Canada has been remarkably responsible over the past decade or so. It has had 12 years of budget surpluses, and can now spend money to fuel a recovery from a strong position. The government has restructured the national pension system, placing it on a firm fiscal footing, unlike our own insolvent Social Security. Its health-care system is cheaper than America's by far (accounting for 9.7 percent of GDP, versus 15.2 percent here), and yet does better on all major indexes. Life expectancy in Canada is 81 years, versus 78 in the United States; "healthy life expectancy" is 72 years, versus 69. American car companies have moved so many jobs to Canada to take advantage of lower health-care costs that since 2004, Ontario and not Michigan has been North America's largest car-producing region.


I could go on. The U.S. currently has a brain-dead immigration system. We issue a small number of work visas and green cards, turning away from our shores thousands of talented students who want to stay and work here. Canada, by contrast, has no limit on the number of skilled migrants who can move to the country. They can apply on their own for a Canadian Skilled Worker Visa, which allows them to become perfectly legal "permanent residents" in Canada—no need for a sponsoring employer, or even a job. Visas are awarded based on education level, work experience, age and language abilities. If a prospective immigrant earns 67 points out of 100 total (holding a Ph.D. is worth 25 points, for instance), he or she can become a full-time, legal resident of Canada.


Companies are noticing. In 2007 Microsoft, frustrated by its inability to hire foreign graduate students in the United States, decided to open a research center in Vancouver. The company's announcement noted that it would staff the center with "highly skilled people affected by immigration issues in the U.S." So the brightest Chinese and Indian software engineers are attracted to the United States, trained by American universities, then thrown out of the country and picked up by Canada—where most of them will work, innovate and pay taxes for the rest of their lives.


If President Obama is looking for smart government, there is much he, and all of us, could learn from our quiet—OK, sometimes boring—neighbor to the north. Meanwhile, in the councils of the financial world, Canada is pushing for new rules for financial institutions that would reflect its approach. This strikes me as, well, a worthwhile Canadian initiative.



(http://www.newsweek.com/2009/02/06/worthwhile-canadian-initiative.html)

2011-04-29 09:45:36 張化橋的Blog

上周,我到澳大利亞度假。按照老習慣,我買來兩份報紙:金融評論(AFR), 和澳大利亞人。一看價格,我大吃一驚:分別3澳元和2.60澳元(澳元比美元略貴)。19911994年,我在坎培拉大學當金融學講師時在那裏"爬過格子"。這兩份報紙我太熟悉了。它們當時都是7080分錢的報紙。我當時的年薪大約4.2萬澳元,現在同樣職位的人賺8.4萬澳元。但今天的講師可比二十年前的講師窮多了。

國人對通脹相當熟悉,每個人都會講幾個有趣的故事。通脹也是一個全球的現象。當然,中國過去三十多年的通脹超過世界上絕大多數國家。可笑的是,我們一直到八十年代底甚至九十年代初還在堅守"社會主義國家不會出現通脹"的舊棺材。

我們的通脹究竟會有何等結局呢?在我斗膽做幾個長期的,模糊的和方向性的猜測之前,我想回顧過去三十多年中國通脹。

在一個理想的世界,通脹是沒有利或弊的:把一元的鈔票變成一元七角或者五元三 角,就好象上市公司最愛玩的遊戲一樣,把股票拆細,一拆五,甚至一拆十。這都不影響任何人的利益(正面負面影響都沒有)。當然,送紅股也是完全一樣,把公 司的資本儲備轉變為股本之類的小把戲也屬此類。以後,股數太多了,大家的算術不夠好,還可以再把股數縮小,比如每七股合成一股,等等。

對於政府來說,通脹就是把紙幣拆細。等到通脹太嚴重時,大家買一斤大蔥要支付幾百萬元時,對大家的算術水準要求太高了,我們還可以刪掉後面幾個零,美其名曰"貨幣改革"。舊中國和世界上很多國家都幹過這類事。不過,遺憾的是,通脹和"貨幣改革"不象股票數量的增減那樣中性,可能會導致利益轉送,巨痛,恐懼,社會不公平,乃至動亂。為什麼?

過去三十多年,中國的通脹是信貸高速擴張的直接結果。銀行業作為一個系統(特 別是包括中央銀行)在沒有錢的情況下也是可以貸款的,當然也可以在錢少的時候貸很多的款。在背後的支撐是公眾對政府和銀行的信任。還是讓我們看看結果。過 去三十多年,中國的廣義貨幣供應量每年的複合增長率超過20%。貨幣供應量是什麼?它就是所有中國企業和家庭的存款總和加上流通中現金。這也就是購買力。這些錢是怎麼來的呢?

首先,中央銀行可以無錢放款(印鈔票)。貸款會直接轉成受貸人的存款,他如果使用這筆款項,另外的人就有了存款,銀行又可以以此存款為基礎發放下一筆貸款(當然要先扣除一點存款準備金)。然後,某些人又有了存款,銀行又可以再放更多的貸款。如此迴圈。

這麼多年,政府在扶持經濟發展的名義下,把銀行利率人為地壓低,低於通脹水 準,所以真實利率為負數,也就創造了對受款人的一種補貼。同時人為地刺激了對貸款的需求。三種人獲得的補貼最多:企業主,負債投資者,負債投機者。誰吃虧 了呢?存款人,老老實實拿固定工資的人們,沒有資格或者沒有關係獲取貸款的人們。當然,社會的公平公正成了犧牲品。

很多人憑直覺認為,通脹期間企業的名義利潤被誇大,所以股票市場應該走好。我 認為這種一個錯誤。錯誤的根源在於它有一個隱含的假定:市盈率會保持不變。但是市盈率可以再跌一半或者更多。為什麼?在通脹期間,即使中央銀行不做貨幣緊 縮,資金也會更加短缺:工廠和商店為了完成同樣多的經濟活動,需要更多的鋪底資金,地產商需要更多資金做土地儲備。居民腰包裏也需要更多的周轉金。在資金 緊張時,資本市場首當其衝。當然,不管中央銀行是否緊縮,名義利率也會上升。而股市的市盈率不過是利率的倒數而已。1968年到1982年,美國的通脹很高,道鐘斯指數幾乎跌了一半,如果考慮到通脹因素,它實際下跌了80%。雖然公司整體上名義的利潤還算可以,但是市盈率從18倍跌倒了6倍。這15年讓美國股民痛苦萬分,雖然1982年以後股市又經歷了17年的大牛市。

在看中國。20002004年,股市不聽政府的話,連跌了五年。雖然官方的通漲資料不很高,但是你想想吧,煤炭,礦石,銅,鋁,鋼鐵,糧食和土地價格在那五年漲得空前劇烈。雖然貨幣供應量每年增長20%以上,但是資金還是很緊張,股市奄奄一息。即使每一個股民都是傻瓜,他們合起來一定是不傻的。

大家再想想中國從1992年以來市盈率的下降的趨勢吧。中間雖然有幾次短暫的牛市,但估值水準的下降趨勢是很明顯的。你也許會說,這種下移主要是因為股票供應量的增加,但我敢預言未來十年市盈率下移的推動力會是過去十年建立起來的貨幣供應量的高臺階,通漲,以及中央銀行未來的信貸控制。

如果未來通脹確實難免,那麼我們如何自保呢?很多人似乎直到最近兩年才發現過 去三十年來的嚴重通脹,所以,急不可耐亂抓機會,以規避通脹。這是不理智的。我認為,股市很可能成為通脹的犧牲品。債券市場更是如此。債券價格與名義利率 成反比。房地產市場也許好一些,但是未來幾年內情勢不妙,投資者必須有長遠的眼光才行。

通脹是國難,也是人禍。控制通脹會需要付出很大的代價:緊縮信貸,提高利率,放慢經濟增長,犧牲大量的就業機會。政府會猶豫和徘徊,政策會隨著失業壓力和銀行壞帳的增加而反復。

如果說過去的通脹年代裏,中國人寅吃卯糧,那麼可以預見未來幾年的緊縮可能需要把虛假的"財富"還給未來。金融市場的減肥會很痛苦,更多的投資機會可能在金融市場之外,即在實體經濟。

我給我弟弟的投資建議如下:

1)買一塊農地,種蔬菜和瓜果;

2)參股隔壁阿三大叔的汽車修理站,並且晚上和週末多去幫忙;

3)支持他失業多年的老婆辦一個幼童上學和放學的接送服務社。再請幾個幫手。工商局肯定會刁難,但是,多忍耐吧。我也沒辦法。

4)投資他老同學的棉花採購站。

5)如果有餘錢,買點銀行的股票,準備持有十年以上。

通漲是國難。國難當頭,大家只圖保值和日子過得去,不要妄想有很大的利潤。 (本文不代表作者的雇主的觀點。)